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‘ HIGH POLITICS ’ AND THE ‘ NEW POLITICAL
HISTORY ’*
DAV ID M . CRA IG
University of Durham
A B S T R ACT. Recent claims about the convergence in methodology between ‘high politics ’ and the
‘new political history ’ remain unclear. The ﬁrst part of this review examines two deeply entrenched
misunderstandings of key works of high politics from the 1960s and 1970s, namely that they proposed elitist
arguments about the ‘ closed ’ nature of the political world, and reductive arguments about the irrelevance of
‘ ideas ’ to political behaviour. The second part traces the intellectual ancestry of Maurice Cowling’s thinking
about politics, and places it within an interpretative tradition of social science. The formative inﬂuences of
R. G. Collingwood and Michael Oakeshott are examined, and Mark Bevir’s Logic of the history of
ideas is used to highlight how Cowling’s approach can be aligned with ‘new political history ’.
In a stimulating essay on the future of political history, Susan Pedersen recently
argued that there has been a convergence between the ‘high politics ’ school and
themore recent ‘new political history’. From the narrower concerns with ambition
and manoeuvre and intrigue, students of the former have become increasingly
involved in the ‘cosmologies ’, ‘ thought worlds ’, and ‘doctrines ’ of politics, and so
have paid greater attention to its ‘ intellectual setting ’.1 Meanwhile, the trajectory
of social history away from social and economic determinism has created a new
autonomy for politics, and more nuanced awareness of the evolution of political
languages and subjectivities and the way that culture and communication could
shape the preoccupations of voters.2 Pedersen’s arguments have been inﬂuential,
but she was not the ﬁrst person to suggest such a convergence. This was ﬁrst
hinted by Philip Williamson – himself an advocate of ‘high politics ’ – in a review
of essays which had stressed their pioneering focus on ‘politicians’ electoral
perceptions, linguistic manipulation and building of social alliances ’. Such ideas,
he suggested, were not in fact new and had been well understood by ‘ the
Department of History, Durham University, 43 North Bailey, Durham, DH1 3EX d.m.craig@durham.ac.uk
* I am grateful to Philip Williamson for the loan of various materials, and for comments on earlier
versions of this review.
1 S. Pedersen, ‘What is political history now?’, in D. Cannadine, ed., What is history now? (London,
2002), p. 42.
2 In this context the phrase ‘new political history’ was coined by J. Vernon, Politics and the people : a
study in English political culture, c. 1815–1867 (Cambridge, 1993), and D. Wahrman, ‘The new political
history: a review essay’, Social History, 21 (1996), pp. 343–54. See also L. Black, ‘Popular politics in
modern British history’, Journal of British Studies, 40 (2001), pp. 431–45, and S. Fielding, ‘Looking for the
‘‘new political history’’ ’, Journal of Contemporary History, 42 (2007), pp. 515–24.
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once-derided and still much-misunderstood ‘‘high politics ’’ historians ’, not least
Maurice Cowling himself.3
The ‘new political history’ has been unusually self-conscious in the way that it
has developed its arguments and sketched its genesis. It largely grew not from
traditional political histories, but from studies of popular politics, labour history,
and electoral sociology. These ﬁelds, so the story goes, were then transformed by
the impact of the ‘ linguistic turn ’ pioneered ﬁrst by Gareth Stedman Jones and
later developed by Patrick Joyce in a post-structuralist direction. It should also be
noted – because it is sometimes neglected – that the wider interest in ‘political
culture ’ was also spurred on by American historians of France such as Keith
Michael Baker, Lynn Hunt, and William Sewell. The key point, however, is that
this theoretical reﬂexiveness has tended to monopolize discussion, and margin-
alize awareness of alternative, but related, traditions and debates. Pedersen notes
that convergence has arisen despite these schools having diﬀerent ‘ intellectual
heritages, methodological convictions and (often) political aﬃliations ’, and sus-
pects that Cowling would have had little sympathy with theoretical trends that
have brought ‘his opponents to his door ’.4 In reaching such conclusions, how-
ever, too little notice is taken of Williamson’s comment that the ‘high politics ’
school remains ‘much-misunderstood’. This is a frequent lament : Cowling him-
self noted in 1990 that what had been called the ‘Peterhouse school of history ’
had been reduced to a ‘ typecast ’ that treated parliamentary politics as ‘Namierite
venality ’, saw parliament itself as an ‘ instrument of class warfare ’, and viewed
politics as a ‘ spectacle of ambition and manoeuvre’.5 Even sympathetic observers
such as Richard Brent, who was rare in examining the methodological cast of the
school, continued to cleave to such a stereotype of its historical conclusions.6 This
review focuses on the early works of ‘high politics ’ (rather than the later work on
religion and doctrine), and tries, ﬁrst, to clear away deeply entrenched mis-
understandings of what they were intended to achieve, before inspecting the
intellectual genealogy of this approach, which turns out to have more in common
with ‘new’ political history than even Pedersen might suppose.
The stereotype was already in place by 1975. Just as the phrase ‘Peterhouse
school ’ was being coined, so historians were coming to think that a coherent
and controversial approach to political history was being pioneered.7 Cowling’s
3 English Historical Review, 113 (1998), p. 1024.
4 Pedersen, ‘What is political history now?’, pp. 42, 40.
5 M. Cowling, Mill and liberalism (2nd edn, Cambridge, 1990), p. xiv.
6 R. Brent, ‘Butterﬁeld’s Tories : ‘‘High politics ’’ and the writing of modern British history’,
Historical Journal, 30 (1987), pp. 947–8. See also R. Crowcroft, ‘Maurice Cowling and the writing of
British political history’, Contemporary British History, 22 (2008), pp. 279–86, which oﬀers a supportive but
sometimes misleading survey of Cowling’s thinking. A forthcoming deﬁnitive account is P. Williamson,
‘Maurice Cowling and modern British political history’, in R. Crowcroft, S. J. D. Green, and
R. Whiting, eds., Philosophy, politics and religion in British democracy : Maurice Cowling and conservatism
(London, 2010).
7 Cowling suggested that the phrase was ﬁrst used by the historian, Joseph Lee, when a fellow of
Peterhouse between 1968 to 1974: New York Review of Books, 10 Apr. 1986.
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1867 : Disraeli, Gladstone and revolution appeared in 1967, followed by The impact of
Labour in 1971. Andrew Jones’s The politics of reform 1884 was published in 1972,
Alistair Cooke and John Vincent’s The governing passion in 1974, and, ﬁnally,
Cowling’s Impact of Hitler in 1976. The fact that a series of seemingly related works
were published within a short span of time, and that all but one were part of the
‘Cambridge Studies in the History and Theory of Politics ’, only reinforced the
idea that they shared a common method. By the time The impact of Hitler was
published, Cowling was being identiﬁed by reviewers as the founder of a move-
ment. Robert Blake wrote of ‘a new school of history’, while Robert Skidelsky
identiﬁed Cowling as its ‘high priest ’. Stephen Koss pushed this metaphor to its
limits by labelling him ‘the patriarch of a new holy order ’ which propagated the
‘Gospel of High Politics ’.8 Most reviewers did not doubt the considerable schol-
arship on display – although occasionally some dismissively referred to research
by index cards.9 Many of them, however, shared doubts about this new approach
to political history, and in repeating the same criticisms – in both academic per-
iodicals and higher journalism – they largely shaped the way future historians
would interpret its main claims.
The ﬁrst recurring criticism was about the purported exclusivity of the world of
‘high politics ’. Was political history really about the apex of power to the ex-
clusion of wider parliamentary, and certainly extra-parliamentary, pressures?
Royden Harrison thought 1867 hampered by the ‘doctrinaire assumption’ that
the world of decision-makers was ‘closed oﬀ from the doings of the vulgar ’, while
Henry Pelling believed it understated the way that feeling in the country could
aﬀect the thoughts of politicians.10 Robert Rhodes James worried that readers of
The impact of Labourmight be ‘uneasy ’ about the focus on high politics, while Peter
Stead lamented the absence of extra-parliamentary political sociology. He be-
lieved that ‘ in our history, as in our politics [there is] too great an inclination to
see High Politics as the sphere where norms are determined’.11 Writing from
a labour history perspective, James Hinton was adamant that, because it detached
high politics from class loyalties and struggles, the book was ignorant of the ‘ larger
historical forces ’ which shaped politics.12 The Economist claimed that Andrew Jones
adopted a sterile approach in The politics of reform and believed nineteenth-century
governance was about more than force and fraud.13 Most reviewers noted the
forthright claims in The governing passion about the autonomy of Westminster and
the irrelevance of Ireland to arguments about home rule.14 In an even-handed
review of The impact of Hitler, J. P. D. Dunbabin commented that Cowling ought
to have looked more closely at public and electoral opinion, while Robert
8 Times Literary Supplement, 25 July 1975, p. 839; Spectator, 26 July 1975, p. 111 ; Listener, 25 Sept. 1975,
p. 407. 9 Economist, 2 Aug. 1975, p. 105.
10 Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History, 15 (1967), p. 40; Historical Journal, 11 (1968), p. 595.
11 Times, 26 Apr. 1971, p. 16; Historical Journal, 17 (1971), p. 208.
12 Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History, 24 (1972), p. 65.
13 Economist, 19 Aug. 1972, p. 54. 14 E.g. Times, 28 Feb. 1974, p. 15.
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Skidelsky claimed ‘more ‘‘ low politics ’’ would have helped’.15 As Derek Beales
put it in 1974, a core belief of this new ‘school ’ of historiography was to treat
‘Westminster as a virtually closed system, scarcely aﬀected by outside pressure ’.16
The second line of attack was even more common, and focused on the claim
that decision-making could be understood in terms of interests and ambitions
rather than policy and ideology. There was a strong sense that Namier lurked
behind this. The Economist was concerned that 1867 would land the nineteenth
century with the same problems that ‘Namierite zeal ’ had created for the eight-
eenth, described The governing passion as ‘old-fashioned Namierite history ’, and
headed a review of The impact of Hitler with ‘pure Namier ’.17 A. J. P. Taylor
agreed, commenting that the latter work followed Namier in its view that ‘poli-
ticians are concerned to get into power and that they take up policies in order to
achieve this end’.18 Rhodes James worried about ‘over-simplifying personal and
collective motives ’ in The impact of Labour, while Hinton thought there was an
excessive focus on the ‘ trivial and nasty ’ world of rhetoric and manoeuvre.19
Martin Harrison argued that it looked at politicians and ideas only insofar as they
‘ impinge on the maneuverings and calculations of the leaders of parties and
factions ’ while Barbara Malament thought it more concerned with tactics than
policy.20 Allen Warren noted that The governing passion depicted a world little in-
ﬂuenced by ‘any complex of ideas or personal principle ’, and while Skidelsky saw
in The impact of Hitler the important claim that ‘public policy ’ could be understood
as an instrument in ‘political conﬂict ’, he thought the insight could be taken too
far.21 Dunbabin, meanwhile, argued that Cowling adopted a ‘defeatist ’ approach
to motivation and so was overly committed to the ‘greasy pole ’ view of politics.22
Beales, again, put it best : the crucial axiom was that ‘ the political game is
what counts ’ and it must be studied in isolation from outside pressures and ‘ from
the promotion of any useful measures, let alone any higher aims’. These were,
he believed, the central points made by the ‘younger school ’ of conservative
historians.23
These arguments have been inﬂuential, but they are, in fact, misleading. That
historians of ‘high politics ’ privileged elites initially seems hard to deny, especially
since The impact of Labour famously announced it would focus on ‘the high politics
of the politicians who mattered ’.24 A passage from The governing passion has, per-
haps, been even more widely circulated : the world of politicians ‘was a closed
15 Historical Journal, 19 (1976), p. 306; Spectator, 26 July 1975, p. 111.
16 D. Beales, ‘Peel, Russell and reform’, Historical Journal, 17 (1974), p. 874.
17 Economist, 22 July 1967, p. 329, 2 Mar. 1974, p. 110, 2 Aug. 1975, p. 105.
18 Observer, 27 July 1975, p. 23.
19 Times, 26 Apr. 1971, p. 16; Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History, 24 (1972), p. 65.
20 American Political Science Review, 68 (1974), p. 810; American Historical Review, 77 (1972), p. 795.
21 English Historical Review, 91 (1976), p. 153; Spectator, 26 July 1975, p. 111.
22 English Historical Review, 88 (1973), p. 145; Historical Journal, 19 (1976), p. 307.
23 Beales, ‘Peel ’, p. 875.
24 M. Cowling, The impact of Labour 1920–1924: the beginning of modern British politics (Cambridge, 1971),
p. 3.
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one. It was closed to those outside, in terms of direct access and inﬂuence : it was
closed also in that politicians were bound to see more signiﬁcance in the deﬁnite
structure of relationships at Westminster, than in their contacts with the world
outside. ’25 This seems to suggest that only high politics mattered and that all other
realms of politics were irrelevant. This is a major misinterpretation. Cowling was,
in fact, saying he would only focus on those ﬁgures who ‘mattered ’ in terms of
national decision-making. He was not saying that these were the only people who
mattered to any aspect of politics. Indeed, he agreed that ‘back-bench opinion,
party feeling, the decisions of civil servants, the preferences of electors, the opi-
nions of newspapers and the objective movements of social power all contribute
to understanding’.26 Similarly Cooke and Vincent thought ‘party organization,
the press, the organized working class, the Ireland of peasants and priests ’ were
things ‘ important in themselves and to those in them’, but that they were not
important to the ‘high politics ’ of 1885–6.27 The impact of Labour was intended to
focus on the minds of leading politicians, and Cowling considered this to be a
preliminary to a wider ‘ total social history’. He accepted that ‘ the impact of
politicians on British public opinion’ would be an important extension of the
project, but it was not what his book was about.28 This does not suggest that other
parts of the system were unimportant – only that their relationship to the apex of
political life needed to be worked out.
This leads on to the central point about the connections between ‘high’ and
‘ low’ politics. This is the major announced theme of 1867, but one all too often
missed by reviewers who, as we have seen, assumed that the book claimed that
the elite world was closed. In fact, Cowling urged the labour school of history not
to assume a priori causal links between popular and high politics, and insisted that
the connections between public protest and parliamentary decisions were so
complex that no necessary relation between them could be sustained.29 The
problem, he suggested, was that labour historians thought that class government
was ‘ stupid as well as bad’ and so underestimated the complexity of its response
to working-class politics. ‘Assuming, what they would not do for working class
action itself, a caricature instead of conducting an investigation, they produce a
parody of the process of decision-making in which government and Parliament
were involved. ’30 This ought not to be seen as a tirade against social history but as
a request that its practitioners apply the same level of sophistication to high
politics as they would to their own ﬁeld. It is true that, in The governing passion,
Cooke andVincent stressed the distance between ‘high’ and ‘ low’ politics, and the
25 A. B. Cooke and J. Vincent, The governing passion : cabinet government and party politics in Britain,
1885–1886 (Brighton, 1974), p. 21. M. Cowling, 1867 Disraeli, Gladstone and revolution: the passing of the Second
Reform Bill (Cambridge, 1967), p. 340, also speaks of a ‘closed’ world. For an account of the diﬀerences
between the approach of Cowling and that of Cooke and Vincent, see M. Bentley, ‘Party, doctrine and
thought’, in M. Bentley and J. Stevenson, eds., High and low politics in modern Britain : ten studies (Oxford,
1983), p. 130. 26 Cowling, Labour, p. 11.
27 Cooke and Vincent, Governing passion, p. 21. 28 Cowling, Labour, p. 4.
29 Cowling, 1867, pp. 288, 340. 30 Ibid., p. 315.
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virtual indiﬀerence of most politicians to, for example, constituency politics,
extra-parliamentary organizations, and trades unions.31 Their conclusion there-
fore was that ‘a politics of dialogue was not to be expected so long as the public
understood very little of Westminster, and Westminster felt itself remote from the
public ’.32 Cowling, by contrast, did speak in terms of dialogue. He believed there
was continual interaction between public opinion and parliament. ‘The interac-
tion took the form of dialogue : the dialogue was a real one. The interaction
reached its most fruitful peak in Parliament. ’33
The nature of this dialogue is very important. In all three ‘high politics ’ books,
Cowling showed that politicians were aware of public opinion. In 1867 parlia-
mentary opinion was aﬀected by ‘a vague sense of the preferences of not one, but
a number of public opinions outside’. Some politicians were even careful to ‘give
an impression of sensitivity to what they took to be public opinion’.34 The same
point was repeated in The impact of Labour : politicians talked of public opinion as a
factor which should guide their behaviour, and in some ways their speech and
actions ‘were aﬀected by what they took it to be’.35 In other words, what mattered
was how politicians perceived the wider public. Cowling assumed ‘that the crude
picture politicians had of the electorate was a signiﬁcant factor in determining
their reaction to the problems it presented ’.36 In the case of the Second Reform
Act, the public agitation was a factor in Conservative decision-making after July
1866, and had a role to play ‘ in creating the climate ’ which led Disraeli to accept
Hodgkinson’s amendment in May 1867.37 But the way in which the extra-
parliamentary pressure played out in parliament did not alone determine the
content of speciﬁc moves : ‘between the journalism and agitation of Potter,
Howell and Beales and governmental or parliamentary decision a ﬁltering process
was interposed’, which turned manhood suﬀrage and equal constituencies into
proposals which were more likely to be accepted by parliamentarians.38 The same
was true in reverse : the leaders of the extra-parliamentary movement interpreted
what politicians did and acted as they saw ﬁt in response, sometimes ratcheting
up the pressure, sometimes letting it down. In The impact of Labour, for instance,
most labour leaders wanted to make an impression on parliament, and distanced
themselves from agitation if it compromised that end.39 Cowling stressed that ‘ the
public movement was aﬀected by what was done in Parliament and Parliament
by what was done outside’, and urged labour historians to pay more attention to
the interactions between the two at the ‘point where parliamentary and popular
radicalism met ’.40 In sum politics was not a series of closed worlds that passed each
other like ships in the night, but rather sets of distinct groups between which there
could be permeability and ﬁltration.
31 Cooke and Vincent, Governing passion, pp. 5–6, 7–8, 20–1.
32 Ibid., p. 21. Compare Vincent’s endorsement of 1867 in Economic History Review, 20 (1967), p. 564.
33 Cowling, 1867, p. 3. 34 Ibid., pp. 4, 61.
35 Cowling, Labour, p. 4. 36 Ibid., p. 11.
37 Cowling, 1867, pp. 61, 286. 38 Ibid., p. 60, my emphasis.
39 Cowling, Labour, p. 39. 40 Cowling, 1867, p. 316.
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Nevertheless the central focus for these historians was ‘high politics ’. This
phrase is actually more complex than is sometimes suggested. It is not synony-
mous with ‘Westminster ’ or ‘parliament ’ or even ‘Whitehall ’. These are worlds
in their own right : they may overlap more with ‘high politics ’ than with popular
politics, but they are not the same. Cooke and Vincent announced that their
prime concern was not ‘administration’ and noted that some leading
politicians – Kimberley, for instance – were more interested in running their de-
partments eﬃciently than jostling with party leaders.41 Similarly, the day-to-day
business of parliament was not always central to ‘high politics ’. Cooke and
Vincent commented on the fact that the 1886 session achieved a substantial
amount of reforming legislation precisely because party leaders were distracted
with ‘high politics ’ elsewhere.42 At times parliamentary politics did become cen-
tral to ‘high politics ’ : it is more important in 1867 than in The impact of Labour or
The impact of Hitler because the centre of anxiety was a speciﬁc piece of legislation.
At other times the focus could reside elsewhere. The historians of ‘high politics ’
have often argued that the formal locations of decision-making – cabinet and
parliament – were frequently not the actual locations : hence Cooke and
Vincent’s famous insistence on ‘ the medium of clubs, the lobby, the dinner table,
the race meeting, the visit to dine and sleep, the morning call, and the stroll in the
park ’.43 Nor should ‘high politics ’ be seen simply as ‘government ’ or even
‘cabinet ’. When Cowling wrote that the political system ‘consisted of ﬁfty or sixty
politicians ’ in tension with one another, it is often forgotten that this was rather a
large cast.44 It was not restricted to oﬃce holders, for ‘ signiﬁcance arose from
mutual recognition; not from oﬃce, but from a distinction between politicians,
inside parliament and outside, whose actions were thought reciprocally important and
those whose actions were not ’.45 Strikingly, in 1867, Cowling stated that reform
leaders such as ‘Beales, Bradlaugh and Potter were as much parts of the political
system as Disraeli or Gladstone’.46 By the 1910s and 1920s, signiﬁcance was also
attached to press barons and labour leaders.47 Conversely, civil servants and
backbenchers were often not part of the ‘ system’ unless they came to be re-
cognized as important ﬁgures in their own right – as Maurice Hankey was in the
1930s. There is a danger of a circular deﬁnition here, but nevertheless the argu-
ment was that the political system at any given point was made up of those ﬁgures
whose power in some sense mattered and so needed to be taken into account
when decisions were being made.
The other central criticism of the ‘high politics ’ school – that its poli-
ticians were motivated by ambition to the exclusion of principle – is equally
41 Cooke and Vincent, Governing passion, pp. xiii–xiv, 5, 119.
42 Ibid., p. 16. 43 Ibid., p. 5.
44 Cowling, Labour, p. 3. The size could vary, even in the same work. The nature and limits of political
science (Cambridge, 1963), speaks of forty to ﬁfty men on p. 30 and seventy to eighty on p. 189.
45 Cowling, Labour, p. 4, my emphasis. 46 Cowling, 1867, p. 288.
47 Cowling, Labour, p. 12; Cooke and Vincent, Governing passion, p. 20.
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misleading.48 Admittedly some reviewers were more perceptive than others :
Dunbabin noted that Cowling looked at the way policy was ‘ﬁltered’ through
party politics, and Skidelsky commented that other historians were not as good at
discussing ‘ issues in terms of politics ’.49 Certainly one can point to many ‘ intel-
lectual ’ politicians in these works. Robert Lowe was a ‘ systematic utilitarian and
ideologist of respectability ’, Lord Carnarvon an ‘earnest, doctrinaire, illiberal ’
man, and James Bryce a ‘party intellectual ’.50 The impact of Labour opens with a
survey of the ‘rag-bag of attitudes, purposes, programmes and intentions ’ of the
labour movement.51 These examples could be multiplied endlessly – suﬃce to say
that the historians of ‘high politics ’ were well aware that politicians had ideas.
Some, perhaps, might come with fully-developed programmes, others, perhaps,
with only half-formed prejudices. Many, of course, had few strong ideas about
anything except their own welfare. Cowling’s point is emphatically not that all
politicians were motivated by ambition. Instead, he saw politicians as having all
manner of beliefs and ambitions at the same time. When discussing the attitudes of
various labour leaders he noted that these ran alongside ‘ the usual amount of
ambition, vanity and manoeuvre inseparable from political action’.52 The point was
made very clear in The impact of Hitler, the aim of which was to remove mis-
understandings about an ‘ implied contradiction between expediency and prin-
ciple ’.53 This was not an argument about politicians being motivated either by
ﬁrm convictions – which would be absurdly naı¨ve – or by selﬁsh interests – which
is pure cynicism – but instead a case about how the nature of politics necessitates a
complex relationship between the two.
Except, perhaps, in the politics of an autocracy, all political systems are social
systems that require agents to work with each other.54 As Cooke and Vincent put
it, ‘The solitary individual cannot commit politics ’ – he or she is incapable of
being eﬀective by working alone.55 This is why party was so important in
Cowling’s arguments, and why he was particularly interested in periods when the
party system was unusually ﬂuid. In the 1860s, the ‘context in which politicians
were operating made it impossible to think of achieving any permanent political
objective without attempting to control, or modify, the course adopted by one
party or another ’. Since numerous individuals made up the political system there
was a ‘ sense of continuing tension between and within and across party ’. No political
leader in the mid-nineteenth century could be so sure of their following that they
could govern ‘without fear either of competition from within or of opposition
from without ’, and by the interwar period they had also to be aware of wider
48 For Cowling’s views of Namier, compare Nature and limits, p. 172, with Religion and public doctrine, III :
Accommodations (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 620, 635–46.
49 Historical Journal, 19 (1976), p. 306; Spectator, 26 July 1975, p. 111.
50 Cowling, 1867, pp. 10, 155; Cooke and Vincent, Governing passion, p. 150.
51 Cowling, Labour, p. 28. 52 Ibid., p. 30, my emphasis.
53 M. Cowling, The impact of Hitler : British politics and British policy, 1933–1940 (Cambridge, 1975), p. ix.
54 Compare 1867, p. 312, and Nature and limits, pp. 181–5.
55 Cooke and Vincent, Governing passion, p. 66.
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public perceptions.56 It followed that successful leaders were ones that were able
to appeal to diverse groups over long periods of time, and to do so they necessarily
had to be ﬂexible and adaptive. As Jones suggests, ‘ﬁxity of purpose is a liab-
ility … where mastery is mastery of the situation after next ’ : shifting and shuﬄing
was an essential skill.57 Indeed, so strong and varied were the pressures on pol-
itical leaders that the ‘high politics ’ approach can sound overtly structural.
Cowling wrote of how politicians ‘cannot usefully be said themselves to have
wanted, desired, or believed anything except what was wanted by all other par-
ticipants in the system’, while Cooke and Vincent thought that a politician
‘submits to enacting the roles the situation gives him and not the role his fantasies
give him’.58 In the 1880s, there was almost no connection between ‘Tory feelings
and Tory actions ’, and even when such connections existed, much depended on
the exact political context.59 Cooke and Vincent accept that Gladstone did not act
solely from ‘gross or opportunist ’ motives, that for some time he had privately
sympathized with home rule, and that from December 1885 he was jotting down
outlines of bills. ‘What we do not know, and still more important, what he could
not know, would be the political context in which these useful contingency
measures might become the basis of legislation. ’ He might have had ideas about
what he wanted, but he was also aware of ‘what it was possible to achieve’.60
What can be concluded is not that politicians had no private beliefs, but rather
that those private beliefs might not be of much use in interpreting public per-
formance at any given moment.
While Cowling’s principal concern was not what politicians believed, he was
undoubtedly interested in what they said. This interest in rhetoric was funda-
mental and once again reveals the Namierite typology to be misleading. The impact
of Hitler insisted that ‘ the public statements of politicians were functional, not
‘‘ true’’ ’ and so the question was what purposes the words served, not whether
they were accurate.61 The historian was dealing with politicians who were ‘his-
trionic ’ : their words and actions were intended to be ambiguous and it was best to
think of them as inhabiting roles, roles which were attuned to the ‘ limits of pol-
itical possibility ’.62 Some political leaders – pre-eminently Disraeli and
Palmerston – were masters of the ‘highest sorts of ambiguity ’, while even a
seeming ideologue such as Bright possessed an ‘unconcealed ambiguity ’ which
could prove useful.63 Sometimes politicians might, without even realizing it, en-
tertain a range of views on particular topics. Lord Derby had a variety of opinions
about how best to oppose Labour and emphasized diﬀerent ones ‘according to
their relevance to the tactical situation’, and Lloyd George’s views can be
56 Cowling, 1867, pp. 4, 5.
57 A. Jones, ‘Where ‘‘governing is the use of words’’ ’, Historical Journal, 19 (1976), p. 252; Cowling,
1867, p. 33.
58 Cowling, 1867, pp. 311–12; Cooke and Vincent, Governing passion, p. 66.
59 Cooke and Vincent, Governing passion, p. 61. 60 Ibid., pp. 52, 55.
61 Cowling, Hitler, p. 2. This was reaﬃrmed in the 1990 edition of Mill and liberalism, p. xv.
62 Cowling, 1867, p. 7. 63 Ibid., pp. 209, 294.
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interpreted in a similar light.64 Sometimes their expressed views were attuned to a
particular end: in 1867 Disraeli and Gladstone both couched reform proposals in
a ‘ language’ designed to play down its innovating aspects, while in The impact of
Labour, all manner of politicians were casting around for a new political ‘ rhetoric ’
to reshape the landscape.65 A central theme of the latter book is the way that the
Conservatives eventually hit upon an ideology to resist Labour. This was an
ideology of Englishness, headed by Baldwin’s ‘mindless rural persona’, and which
was capable of binding together ‘moral, industrial, agrarian, libertarian, anglican
and nonconformist opinion’. The purpose of this ideology was resistance to
socialism, but its advantage was that it made it possible ‘ to talk about some-
thing – almost anything – apart from the function the party had to perform’.66 In
terms of belief, some of those who articulated this ideology may also have believed
it : ‘Bryant probably meant what he wrote. Davidson certainly did. ’67 It is clear,
then, that even in these works of ‘high politics ’ rhetoric is part of the toolkit of a
politician. That which was said might only have a tenuous relationship with what
the politician believed, or it might be that, being said over and over again, it came
to be something which he believed fervently.68 The point, however, is that ideas
certainly did matter, and could not be emptied out of the landscape of ‘high
politics ’.
The problem was how to uncover the ‘ function’ of rhetoric and so expose the
real motivation for political action. It was argued that most of the sorts of material
typically used by political historians – newspapers and pamphlets – gave ‘mar-
ginal ’ returns, because their authors rarely knew why politicians acted in the way
that they did.69 Parliamentary speeches also had to be used carefully : they could
be used to reconstruct cultural and political assumptions, but they did not nor-
mally tell the historian why the speaker spoke, nor what objective he had.
Sometimes a speech might be used as an instrument of self-advancement, some-
times as an expression of true beliefs, and sometimes because the politician was
expressing ‘ local, personal or extraneous ’ issues. Sometimes he might simply
have been told what to say by a frontbencher.70 In other words public speech did
not in itself reveal the ‘relationship between belief and calculation ’ which was so
central to understanding why decisions were made.71 It is for these reasons that
this approach to political history is closely associated with a strong preference for
private over public sources, because letters and diaries provided the best chance
of glimpsing the real motives that lay behind political performances. These
64 Cowling, Labour, pp. 9, 418; Cowling, Hitler, pp. 36–41.
65 Cowling, 1867, p. 54 ; Cowling, Labour, p. 5.
66 Cowling, Labour, pp. 422–3. See also M. Cowling, ‘The present position’, in M. Cowling, ed.,
Conservative essays (London, 1978), p. 10. 67 Cowling, Hitler, p. 260.
68 See Nature and limits, pp. 185–6, and ‘The present position’, p. 9.
69 A. Jones, The politics of reform, 1884 (Cambridge, 1972), p. 11.
70 Cowling, 1867, pp. 317, 318.
71 Cowling, Labour, p. 39. The same was true of oﬃcial publications: Nature and limits, pp. 20–3;
Hitler, p. 2.
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historians were not at all as naı¨ve about these sources as is sometimes suggested.72
Cowling was well aware that while some politicians probably did reveal their
actual motives in correspondence (for instance Derby in the second half of 1866),
others who were in the thick of political management (such as Disraeli and
Gladstone) were more cautious.73 He concluded that evidence about the ‘minds
and intentions ’ of major players in which they explained the ‘grounds and ob-
jectives ’ of their policies with an absence of ‘ tactical intent ’ or with ‘ tactical
intention that is readily discernible ’ was ‘extremely slender ’.74 It was, however,
such information which had the best chance of illuminating the relationship be-
tween what politicians desired and what they said and did. At this point it is worth
stressing – because it is often forgotten – that Cowling’s approach was not restric-
ted to political leaders. In a penetrating assessment of reform societies in the 1860s,
he distinguished between the ‘ substantial objectives of their policies ’ and the
‘ tactical purposes by which their objectives were surrounded’. While this was ob-
vious in dealing with parliamentary politicians ‘ it is no less necessary in evaluating
the activities of those whose centre of power lay outside Parliament ’.75
It should now be clear that ‘ambition and manoeuvre’ were only elements of
political understanding. This need not mean the ambition was always narrowly
personal and selﬁsh. It could be directed to the perceived interests of a class or,
perhaps, the nation, a group or, most often, a party. It should also be clear that
‘ rhetoric ’ was an inseparable component of politics because of its role in per-
suading others in the system. None of this means that all political decisions were
steeped in ‘high politics ’.76 Cooke and Vincent showed that, because the party
leaders in 1886 were so wrapped up in problems of party structure, ﬁfty-nine
public acts – many of a radical liberal nature – were passed with little contention.
This was legislation in the virtual absence of high politics, and so its content
can be explained without recourse to ‘ambition and manoeuvre’.77 Cowling
made the same point. In The impact of Labour, he argued that the politics of 1919–22
can be seen as the ‘history of serious, powerful and determined attempts at a
high level of competence to resolve the major problems’ created by war and
peace, but that they were ‘detached from the world context to which they
belonged’ and became battle cries for ‘conﬂicting groups whose objects were to
gain, or keep, political power more even than to settle Europe’s problems or
improve Britain’s place in it ’.78 In The impact of Hitler, he argued that foreign policy
became central in the 1930s ‘not only because it was ’ – meaning that it was
important in its own right – but also because politicians could ‘ﬁt it into the
political battle ’ begun in the 1920s. Hence ‘ the politics of the Powers must be seen
through the ﬁltering eﬀected by the politics of the parties ’. Crucially, however,
72 E.g. P. M. Gurowich, ‘Party and independence in the early and mid-Victorian House of
Commons’ (Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge, 1986), pp. 8–9. 73 Cowling, 1867, pp. 325–31.
74 Ibid., p. 331. 75 Ibid., p. 242.
76 This is a common misperception of critics, e.g. P. Clark, ‘Political history in the 1980s’, Journal of
Interdisciplinary History, 12 (1981), p. 47. 77 Cooke and Vincent, Governing passion, p. 16.
78 Cowling, Labour, p. 109.
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Cowling also argued that when ‘ foreign policy is marginal ’ – or indeed any policy
is marginal – it was ‘possible to neglect the total situation and still show how
policy is conducted ’.79 Put in simple terms this meant that when policies did not
raise, or could not be used to raise, substantial questions that aﬀected the party
system, historians did not need to interpret their operation through the lens of
‘high politics ’, and might even be able to explain them as the outcome of ‘rel-
evant decisions relevantly taken about the substantive merits of questions ’.80
It follows from all this that the ‘high politics ’ school did not propose a cynical
or pessimistic or defeatist understanding of politics. Indeed, the histories written
by Cowling were applications of various philosophical and sociological opinions
that he had acquired since the 1940s. While there is now a wide and growing
interest in his doctrines, much of this generally focuses on his political and re-
ligious thought, rather than on his historical methodology.81 However, in a com-
prehensive but esoteric essay, Peter Ghosh has oﬀered the view that ultimately
Cowling is ‘not properly a historian at all ’. His historical writings reject the
intellectual tools forged since the Enlightenment, reveal ‘ ignorance of any form
of social or institutional explanation’, and so are ‘alien to history in their con-
ception’. These problems, Ghosh continued, were generally veiled by the narrow
time-frames adopted by the ‘high politics ’ trilogy. While Cowling’s pupils
have tackled some of the issues he has raised – especially the ‘overwhelming
diﬃculty ’ of explaining the relationship between ideas and action – they have
been unaware that they were dealing with problems that Cowling thought were
‘ insoluble ’.82 The root of Ghosh’s argument is that by committing himself a priori
to a radical relativism and individualism he created an insurmountable problem
for all his historical works.83 This is an important argument which raises funda-
mental questions, but as we shall see the case is overstated. Nevertheless, Ghosh
recognized that Cowling’s studies of ‘high politics ’ were themselves steeped in a
philosophical atmosphere from which they cannot easily be detached.
Attention must now be given to The nature and limits of political science andMill and
liberalism. Cowling conceived 1867 as an historical application of the arguments of
these ﬁrst two books, and referred the reader back to them for theoretical guid-
ance.84 But in looking for the intellectual inﬂuences that lay behind these works,
the historian is hampered by the lack of private papers. As Cowling later
explained, in the 1950s he wanted to read, rather than write, so that he could
‘develop’ and know ‘how to say what I thought I wanted to say’.85 The ﬁrst
79 Cowling, Hitler, pp. 1, 5, my emphasis. 80 Cowling, 1867, p. 3.
81 E.g. C. Covell, The redeﬁnition of conservatism: politics and doctrine (London, 1986), pp. 144–71;
I. Harris, ‘Religion, authority and politics : the thought of Maurice Cowling’, Political Science Reviewer,
26 (1997), pp. 434–81.
82 P. Ghosh, ‘Towards the verdict of history: Mr Cowling’s doctrine’, in M. Bentley, ed., Public and
private doctrine : essays in British history presented to Maurice Cowling (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 306–8.
83 Ibid., pp. 274–5. 84 Cowling, 1867, p. 312.
85 See Michael Bentley, ‘ Interviews with historians: Maurice Cowling’, Institute of Historical
Research DVD, c. 1998.
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volume of Religion and public doctrine provides something like an intellectual auto-
biography, but its focus is primarily his religious development, rather than his
methodological alignments. Interestingly, he notes that he picked up the ‘dis-
missal of the politics of principle ’ at Cambridge in the 1940s from reading Hegel,
and, more importantly, Nietzsche.86 The latter, of course, articulated the most
inﬂuential case that truth is perspectival, and that statements of principle masked
the will to power. A central inﬂuence was Butterﬁeld who, amongst other things,
taught him that even a reasonable degree of ‘cupidity ’ and ‘wilfulness ’ among
men could create ‘predicaments and dilemmas’ in politics and ‘ tie events into
knots ’.87 In addition, Cowling’s experience of ‘ the outer fringes of the English
polity ’ during the 1950s drew attention to the diﬀerences between ‘political so-
ciety ’ and ‘society at large ’ which sowed the seeds of The nature and limits of political
science and, later, the ‘high politics ’ trilogy.88 This was combined with the inﬂu-
ence of English Idealism, a movement out of favour in mid-twentieth-century
Britain, but one which proved central to Cowling’s intellectual development.
Examination of R. G. Collingwood and Michael Oakeshott enables a more
precise focus on Cowling’s approach to political history. Their writings provided
both an antidote to much that he opposed, and set the foundations for his ap-
proach to history. Both provided a strong sense of the autonomy of history from
science, and both included naturalism and positivism among their antipathies.
They were equally sceptical of the pretensions of ‘ social science ’. As Cowling
summarized, history ‘knew nothing and cared less about a ‘‘natural or logical
development ’’ and had nothing to learn from ‘‘cause and eﬀect ’’ or from Bury’s
‘‘conﬂux of coincidences ’’. The ‘‘ science of history ’’ was said to be an absurd
notion’. It followed that any attempt to claim special predictive power for such
a science was absurd. Furthermore, both opposed the idea that history as the
‘past-as-it-was ’ could be recovered. Oakeshott ‘ rejected objectivity, ‘‘unbiased
history’’ and the idea that the historian ‘‘begins ’’ by collecting material ’ and
Collingwood taught that historians always asked questions of the past and that the
facts were never independent of the judgements of historians.89 The seeds were
sown for Cowling’s conviction (‘acquired early and never lost ’) that ‘professional
history’ was an illusion because the perspective of the historian always entered
into the research he conducted, and so ‘historical writing is an instrument of
doctrine, whatever historians may imagine ’.90
In 1949, Cowling encountered the Collingwood of The idea of history, The idea
of nature, and the Autobiography, and, perhaps, of An essay on metaphysics. This body
of work gave a ﬁllip to the study of the history of thought and supplied under-
graduates with ‘a justiﬁcation of non-scientiﬁc study based on the view that
86 M. Cowling, Religion and public doctrine in modern England (Cambridge, 1980), p. xxi.
87 H. Butterﬁeld, Christianity and history (London, 1949), p. 37, and highlighted by Jones, ‘Where
‘‘governing is the use of words’’ ’, p. 253. See also Cowling, Religion, pp. 237–8.
88 Cowling, Religion, p. xx. The best account of Cowling’s early years is recalled to Bentley,
‘ Interviews with historians: Maurice Cowling’. 89 Cowling, Religion, p. 258.
90 Ibid., p. xxiii.
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human action and thought, being free and self-determining, could be grasped,
discussed or recreated by critical, philosophical or historical thinking’.91 In the
slogan that ‘all history is the history of thought ’, Collingwood provided a basis for
the subsequent development of the Cambridge approach to the history of political
thought.92 This legacy to intellectual history, however, is misleading because
Collingwood was outlining an approach for all historians. In distinguishing be-
tween the ‘outside ’ and ‘ inside ’ of an event, he insisted that only by under-
standing the latter – ‘getting inside other people’s heads ’ – could one provide
explanation.93 This was as true for understanding the Battle of Trafalgar as for the
Two treatises of government. It was true of politics :
Political history is the history of political thought : not ‘political theory ’, but the thought
which occupies the mind of a man engaged in political work: the formation of a policy, the
planning of means to execute it, the attempt to carry it into eﬀect, the discovery that others
are hostile to it, the devising of ways to overcome their hostility, and so forth.94
In other words Collingwood could provide a base not just for those interested in
political ideas, but also for those concerned with political action. Collingwood
asked historians to look at the thought that accompanied and underpinned
behaviour, and so, while a history of high politics might reject the view that ‘ ideas ’
(in the strong sense) had much impact on politicians, it could accept that
‘ ideas ’ (in this weaker sense) remained central to explaining events from ‘ inside
other people’s heads ’.
Collingwood also supplied Cowling with ‘a complicated type of relativism’
which had similarities with his earlier engagements with Arnold Toynbee and,
more importantly, Karl Barth via Edwyn Hoskyns. The latter, in particular,
convinced him that when set against the transcendence of God the insigniﬁcance
of man meant that ‘no moral or political system has any authority, and more or
less anything will do’.95 What Cowling had in mind were Collingwood’s ‘brilliant
conceptions ’ of ‘absolute presuppositions and total contextualization’ which
‘deserved better ’ than to be reduced to a ‘caricature ’ about the importance of
context.96 The idea of ‘absolute presuppositions ’ was sketched in the Autobiography
and detailed in the Essay on metaphysics. Metaphysics, Collingwood argued, should
concern itself with laying bare the foundations of a system of knowledge
beyond which no further questions could be asked. It was an attempt, ﬁrst, ‘ to
discover what the people of that time believe about the world’s nature ’ and,
second, ‘ to discover the corresponding presuppositions of other peoples and
other times ’ and to trace how ‘one set of presuppositions has turned into
91 Ibid., p. 160.
92 Although now a cliche´, this phrase was used repeatedly in R. G. Collingwood, The idea of history
(Oxford, 1946), pp. 115, 117, 215, 317, and endorsed in idem, An autobiography (Oxford, 1939), p. 110.
93 Collingwood, Idea of history, p. 213; idem, Autobiography, p. 58.
94 Collingwood, Autobiography, p. 110.
95 Cowling, Religion, pp. 162, 94. For the way these ideas were conveyed to Cowling by his tutor in
1943–4, see pp. 73–96. 96 Ibid., p. 188.
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another ’.97 It followed that there could be no absolute presuppositions which held
universally for all humans across time and space, but that there could be shared
presuppositions held by people with common ‘cultural equipment ’, such as ‘social
and political habits, religion, education and so forth ’.98 Cowling noted three
conclusions. First, there could be no eternal problems in metaphysics only dif-
ferent problems at speciﬁc historical moments. Second, the complex and variable
nature of absolute presuppositions meant they could not be used to establish a
deductive science. Finally, these presuppositions were a constitutive element of all
thought. Collingwood ‘made it clear that the metaphysical exposure of pre-
suppositions could be applied to all systematic objects ’ and that metaphysics was
really the exposure by historical criticism of the roots of civilization.99 These ideas
have had a growing inﬂuence since Collingwood’s death, and various scholars
have noted their aﬃnity with those of Wittgenstein, Kuhn, Foucault, and even
Nietzsche.100 What impressed Cowling was that ‘absolute presuppositions ’
seemed to show that at root our commitments were historically contingent and
lacked foundations. As he explained in a radio discussion, certain intellectual
conﬂicts – especially questions about religion – dealt with ‘ fundamental assump-
tions ’ about which appeals to evidence and reason became meaningless.101
The doctrine of ‘ total contextualization’ had a related appeal. This arose from
Collingwood’s ideas about the logic of ‘question and answer ’, which claimed that
any proposition was the answer to a question, and that that question was an
answer to another question and so on, all the way down to absolute presuppo-
sitions, about which no further questions could be asked. If reconstructing the
context was essential to capture the meaning of a proposition, then ultimately ‘ the
whole of a civilization is the only adequate context to consider in using artefacts as
material for creating an historical past ’.102 In practice, of course, it was impossible
for historians to know this totality. Nevertheless, in his earliest writings, Cowling
insisted that, to understand a writer, it was necessary to examine not just what he
said, but how and why he came to say it. This meant paying attention not just to
‘ intellectual tradition ’ but also to ‘personal situation’ and relevant social and
political contexts. It meant using a person’s ‘ intimate writings ’ – letters and dia-
ries – to provide insight into ‘personal consciousness ’ and so distinguish ‘what he
thought from what he said’.103 This approach to context helps explain Cowling’s
criticisms of sub-ﬁelds like the histories of historiography and of political thought :
both were abridgements of ‘a history of the whole of thought ’.104 It also helps
97 Collingwood, Autobiography, p. 66. See also idem, An essay on metaphysics, ed. R. Martin (Oxford,
1998), pp. 70–4. 98 Collingwood, Metaphysics, p. 60.
99 Cowling, Religion, p. 178.
100 See R. Martin, ‘Editor’s Introduction’ to Collingwood, Metaphysics, pp. lxxxii–iii n. 4.
101 M. Cowling, ‘Theory and politics ’, transcript of radio broadcast, c. 1963, p. 11, in the possession
of Philip Williamson.
102 Cowling, Religion, p. 188. See Collingwood, Autobiography, pp. 29–43; idem,Metaphysics, pp. 23–33.
103 See M. Cowling, ‘Mr Woodruﬀ ’s Acton’, Cambridge Journal, 6 (1952), p. 181; Nature and limits,
pp. 46–7. 104 Cowling, Religion, p. 230.
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explain one of his disagreements with Quentin Skinner, who was accused of
contextualizing propositions only within a ﬁeld of linguistic meanings. Cowling
claimed to oﬀer an ‘actual (or historical) ’ rather than an ‘exhortatory (or
Skinnerian) ’ contextualization.105 There was a further reason why Cowling ap-
proved of ‘ total contextualization ’ : the historian himself was part of the context
he investigated. Collingwood ‘understood, even when he did not explain, that
historical writing is wrenched out of a present totality which determines the di-
rection of historical thinking, is vital to the creation of ‘‘ the past ’’, and demands
self-consciousness about assumptions as an essential facet of historical think-
ing ’.106 This made Cowling, on the one hand, sceptical towards claims to his-
torical neutrality and, on the other, interested in the attitudes that historians
brought to their research. He recognized that the concepts we hold infuse the
work we pursue, and this was to be a central plank of his scepticism towards
objectivity.
Cowling ﬁrst read Oakeshott in 1948 (probably in the Cambridge Journal ) and by
the time The nature and limits of political science was published he was familiar with
most of Oakeshott’s writings.107 Many of these were, as Cowling comments, at-
tempts to change the ‘ tone and assumptions ’ of political debate in the post-war
climate. The unifying theme was resistance to the claim that technical knowledge
(‘ ideology’) was the only genuine form of knowledge and that practical knowledge
(‘ tradition ’) should give way to it. Cowling later summarized this as the view that
human behaviour is a matter of art, not nature ; that human conduct is rational when it
exhibits intelligence appropriate to the idiom of the activity it is concerned with; and that
concrete activity – knowledge of how to act – is ‘practical ’ or ‘ traditional ’ knowledge, the
‘ sort of knowledge without … which … the pursuit of any concrete activity is imposs-
ible ’.108
Oakeshott did not believe that technical knowledge was irrelevant, only that its
place was alongside practical knowledge. The nature and limits of political science
upheld these arguments. In the world of practice, the absence of articulate doc-
trine did not mean that actions lacked a purposive dimension. All persons held a
‘picture of the world’ which was shaped by more than political philosophy or
formal education. It was shaped by ‘ the whole of the education and the whole of a
religion’ that a person had, and this included the ‘conventional habits, reasonable
laws, acceptable customs and well understood liberties ’ which made up a political
structure. It followed that persons were ‘ in the grip of, dependent on, and in one
sense determined by’ conditions over which they had no control : their very
105 Cowling, ‘ Introduction’ to Mill and liberalism, p. xv. He also objected to Skinner’s liberalism and
irreligion: Religion, III, pp. 619–21. 106 Cowling, Religion, pp. 188–9.
107 He later criticized Nature and limits for its statements about academic neutrality, arguing that all
academics had doctrines to peddle : Religion, p. xxii ; ‘ Introduction’ to Mill and liberalism, p. xi.
108 Cowling, Religion, p. 272. The quotation is from M. Oakeshott, ‘Rationalism in politics ’, in
Rationalism in politics and other essays (Indianapolis, IN, 1991), p. 12. The statement par excellence is
‘Political education’ in the same volume, pp. 43–69.
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constitution as agents.109 This was traditional knowledge or ‘rational prejudice ’,
concepts which only appeared paradoxical to those who thought that rationality
must be judged by ‘deliberate premeditation and rational intention’. While many
political decisions were indeed made as a result of purposive deliberation, others
could be reached almost spontaneously and seemingly by intuition: ‘action need
not be self-conscious in order to be rational or right ’.110 It followed that while
some politicians spoke of adhering to principles and others of conforming to
tradition when they acted, it was nevertheless true that both had principles and
pragmatism inscribed in their political decisions. ‘Moral action does not emerge
from the utterance of irrelevant slogans – or even from the utterance of relevant
ones – it emerges ambulando, in the full accomplishment of practice. ’111 What
Oakeshott gave Cowling – among other things – was a way of thinking about
political behaviour which gave signiﬁcance to principles and prejudices without
turning the individual agent into a bearer of articulate ideology. Hence, like
Collingwood, Oakeshott thought a study of politics should be about ‘what people
have thought and said about what happened: the history, not of political ideas,
but of the manner of our political thinking ’.112
The sorts of arguments Cowling took from Collingwood and Oakeshott enable
us to locate him within debates about the philosophy of social science. This is
made clearer by Peter Winch’s Idea of a social science, which drew on Wittgenstein,
Collingwood, and Oakeshott to present an extremely inﬂuential argument in the
interpretative tradition which stood against the claims of naturalistic social sci-
ence. Cowling thought it provided something like a ‘systematic ’ account of social
science, and in attacking J. S. Mill, it pre-empted some of the arguments used a
few years later in Mill and liberalism.113 (Cowling stressed, ﬁrst, that because all
historical knowledge was dependent on the perspective of the historian, there was
no objective knowledge of ‘ the past ’ from which laws of behaviour could be
distilled, and, second, that the generalizations adduced from historical research
had no special status as explanations, let alone as predictions.)114 In presenting an
alternative approach to social science, Winch stated that ‘Our idea of what be-
longs to the realm of reality is given for us in the language that we use. The
concepts we have settle for us the form of the experience we have of the world. ’115
The diﬀerent ways of making the world intelligible – scientiﬁc, religious, philo-
sophical, etc. – could not be reduced to a single type. Winch was inspired by
Wittgenstein’s concept of following a rule : the rules of any form of meaningful
behaviour constituted it as that sort of activity and so enabled agents to have
understanding of such practices and, ultimately, to ‘go on’. Interestingly, Winch
also explored the similarities this approach had with Oakeshott’s arguments
109 Cowling, Nature and limits, pp. 131, 208, 198, 206.
110 Ibid., pp. 135, 138. 111 Ibid., p. 212.
112 Oakeshott, ‘Political education’, p. 63. 113 Cowling, Nature and limits, p. 16.
114 Cowling, Mill and liberalism, pp. 118–31.
115 P. Winch, The idea of a social science and its relation to philosophy (London, 1958), p. 15.
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about habitual behaviour.116 The work concluded with an endorsement of
Collingwood’s approach to historical explanation as the basis for social science :
social relations exist in and through the ideas current in society and so the task of
the historian – or social scientist – is to trace the internal relations between
them.117 Cowling’s thinking can clearly be placed within the same interpretative
approach to social science. We can draw out the implications of his arguments
further by comparing them with the recent work of Mark Bevir, which also allows
us to consider the criticisms that relativism and individualism fatally undermine
his histories.
The logic of the history of ideas outlines a sophisticated approach to historical
understanding and explanation which draws on post-foundationalism and ideal-
ism. Its arguments are shaped by a series of debates with Wittgenstein,
Collingwood, Gadamer, Kuhn, Foucault, Winch, and Skinner among others.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, its key themes are similar to those examined by
Cowling. Let us take the issue of objectivity ﬁrst. Bevir rejects traditional objec-
tivism, but argues that this need not automatically lead to absolute scepticism
about a form of objective knowledge. There is a strong scepticism associated with
Dilthey and Gadamer which suggests it is impossible to recover the past because
‘ the current meaning of a historical event depends on a grasp of history as a unity
culminating in the present ’ and that ‘ to grasp the full meaning of a historical
event, we would have to see history as a whole, which we cannot do’. There is
also a weaker scepticism which claims that ‘our contemporary presuppositions
enter into our understanding in a way that prevents us having real knowledge of
the past ’.118 Bevir’s rejection of pure facts means he accepts this latter position,
but argues that a form of objectivity can be reached by comparing rival theories
for accuracy, comprehensiveness, consistency, progressiveness, fruitfulness, and
openness. The important point is that rejection of ‘ foundational objectivism’ does
not collapse into ‘ irrationalist relativism’.119 Cowling sometimes seems to endorse
the strong position, but his practice is compatible with the weaker stance. In an
interview in 1990, he spoke of his distaste for the ‘ truth rhetoric ’ and belief that
objectivity was not a ‘useful concept ’ but went on to say that the historian uses
material to make
the past that he wants to make and that he thinks plausible. Obviously truth comes into it in
the sense that there can be a misrepresentation of the material, and other historians will tell
you if you misrepresent it … Obviously historians are biased. There’s no reason why they
shouldn’t be. Other people will correct them. It’s a pluralistic activity.120
The defence of procedural individualism – as distinct from atomistic or meth-
odological individualism – is central to the Logic. Bevir argues against theories
which state that structures or conventions ﬁx the meanings of utterances and
116 Ibid., pp. 54–65. 117 Ibid., p. 133.
118 M. Bevir, The logic of the history of ideas (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 122–3. 119 Ibid., p. 80.
120 N. Attallah, ed., Singular encounters (London, 1990), pp. 130–1, my emphasis.
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insists that meanings always belong to agents. Conventionalists, such as Skinner,
argue that because ‘ language presupposes social conventions ’ an author ‘must
follow existing social conventions. But to establish that shared conventions are
necessary for a language to exist is not to establish that authors cannot successfully
express their intentions unless they respect the ruling conventions. ’121 Instead,
conventions and structures are best seen as abstractions based on aggregates of
individual viewpoints. Bevir goes on to explain that the ‘webs of belief ’ of any
person can be explained in terms of a ‘ tradition ’ which connects – conceptually
and temporally – these beliefs against an acquired social background. Unlike a
paradigm or language or episteme as commonly conceived, traditions are not
hypostatized entities and have no existence separate from the individual beliefs
that constitute them. Moreover, they have no determining power. ‘People reach
the webs of belief they do against the background of traditions, but they are
agents who can extend, modify, or even reject the traditions that provided the
background to their initial webs of belief. ’122 The logical possibility of agency is
built into the concept of tradition even if some traditions discourage agency.
Next, Bevir argues that individuals modify the traditions they inherit as a result of
dilemmas – that is, when a new understanding clashes with an existing web of
beliefs and causes the latter to be modiﬁed to account for it. The concept of a
dilemma has some similarity with Kuhn’s idea of an anomaly, although the latter
refers only to cases where dramatic shifts of belief occur. By contrast, dilemmas
occur all the time: ‘even the trivial puzzles that lead all of us to adopt new beliefs
all the time in our everyday existence’.123 Thus Bevir’s Logic provides a framework
for thinking about individual beliefs, the social background against which they
arose, and the reasons for their continuity and change.
These arguments can cast light on the more problematic aspects of Cowling’s
work. Both Bentley and Ghosh see a ‘staunch individualism’ in his thought which
undermines the application of compound notions such as structures, concepts,
institutions, and so on.124 It is certainly true that prosopography increasingly
came to dominate his writings, and it is also true that talk of structures was never
predominant. The language of structure, however, is often used confusingly and
has naturalistic tendencies which Cowling opposed. The minds of his agents,
nevertheless, are shaped by a social inheritance. The nature and limits of political
science, as we have seen, describes political actors as imbued with habitual and
traditional knowledge, while 1867 speaks of political leaders acting out roles which
their positions had made second nature.125 Furthermore, the aim of Religion and
public doctrine was to reveal the ‘deep structure ’ of the doctrines of writers, and by
looking at their whole œuvre it was hoped that such ‘structures ’ might be more
clearly visible. There are clear echoes here of the ‘absolute presuppositions ’ of
121 Bevir, Logic, p. 46. 122 Ibid., p. 199. 123 Ibid., p. 229.
124 M. Bentley, ‘Prologue: the retiring Mr Cowling’, in Public and private doctrine, p. 8; Ghosh,
‘Towards the verdict of history’, passim. 125 Cowling, 1867, p. 312.
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Collingwood.126 Although he recognized that such presuppositions could
be shared, Cowling rarely made an eﬀort to ‘ﬁnd any ‘‘ structures ’’ between
thinkers ’.127 As Bevir’s concept of tradition indicates, however, there was nothing
to prevent him from embarking on this task. Indeed, he often gestured in this direc-
tion, as when he sketched a tradition of conservative thought in ‘The present
position’ or invoked traditions such as romanticism, evangelicalism, idealism, and
so on.128 The ‘high politics ’ trilogy was primarily concerned with the immediate
motives and actions of numerous politicians, but that it did not map the under-
lying intellectual traditions has not prevented other historians from doing so.129 It
appears that while Cowling was aware of the structures or traditions that under-
pinned the performances of individuals (he peppered his trilogy with short bio-
graphies of leading politicians which sketched their educational and intellectual
inﬂuences), he was uneasy with any analysis that seemed to give them deter-
ministic power.
Bevir’s primary concern is with beliefs expressed in a work rather than the
motives which led to that work. ‘All historians study the same things. It is just that
historians of ideas ask questions exclusively about the beliefs these things express,
whereas other historians also ask questions about the pro-attitudes that motivated
these things. ’130 He also argues that there must be a logical presumption – though
not an expectation – in favour of sincere, conscious, and rational beliefs. Skinner,
by contrast, uses speech-act theory to argue that the meaning of a work includes
not just its sense and reference, but also its point. Indeed this is often assumed to
be one of the advantages of his method: it encourages historians to look at why
utterances were made, rather than to assume them to be sincere. The classic
analysis is of Lord Bolingbroke, who spoke in a Country Whig language not
because he believed it, but because by appealing to other Whigs to undermine
Walpole, his own ambition was served.131 In its focus on the purpose of speech,
Cowling seems closer to Skinner because he was interested in what politicians
‘do’ with ideas.132 Bevir, however, also proposed procedures for thinking about
cases of deception. Historians should pay attention to the actual beliefs of the
deceiver, they should examine his expressed beliefs in terms of the eﬀects he
thought they would have, and they should explain the disjunction between the
two sets of attitudes by a pro-attitude which motivated the deception in the ﬁrst
place.133 Bevir accepts such evidence is often diﬃcult to acquire, but that this is
the appropriate way to proceed. This is just what Cowling did in his ‘high poli-
tics ’ trilogy: he looked at political rhetoric as a form of expressed belief, and used
126 Cowling, Religion, p. xxiv. 127 Bentley, ‘Prologue’, p. 9.
128 Cowling, ‘The present position’, pp. 22–3.
129 See J. Parry, Democracy and religion : Gladstone and the liberal party, 1867–1875 (Cambridge, 1986).
130 Bevir, Logic, p. 141.
131 Q. Skinner, ‘The principles and practice of opposition: The case of Bolingbroke versus
Walpole ’ in N. McKendrick, ed., Historical perspectives : studies in English thought and society in honour of J. H.
Plumb (London, 1974), pp. 93–128. 132 Cowling, ‘Theory and politics ’, p. 10.
133 Bevir, Logic, pp. 269–70.
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private correspondence to gather information both about the motivating pro-
attitudes, and even the actual, private beliefs.
So far our concern has been with explaining individual thought and conduct.
The ‘high politics ’ trilogy, however, depicts a tightly woven intersubjective world
composed of around ﬁfty individuals all reacting to each other. It followed that
the consequences of almost any action were potentially unpredictable. In politics,
consequences mattered as much as intentions and ‘the consequences of even the
most limited intentions are at the mercy of many factors over which no single will
can have control ’. Wherever one looked, there was ‘unexpected accident, un-
foreseen clash, unpredictable predicament ’ crashing in on purposes and inten-
tions. The very ‘nature of the world’ meant that there was a large gap between
intended aim and actual consequence.134 The knowledge of this ensured that
most politicians, most of the time, were trying, as best they could, to take account
of whatever circumstances seemed relevant whenever they acted, in order to
control, as best they could, the consequences of those actions. While this ‘calcu-
lation of possibility ’ was not the whole of politics, without it politics was imposs-
ible.135 This was understood by Collingwood when he argued that an individual
entered a world ‘crowded’ with other people ‘all pursuing activities of their own’,
and so there would be little room for his own activity ‘unless he can so design this
that it will ﬁt into the interstices of the rest ’. The ‘situation’ was made up of the
thoughts of all persons involved, and so for ‘a man about to act, the situation is his
master, his oracle, his god. Whether his action is to prove successful or not de-
pends on whether he grasps the situation rightly or not. ’ A wise man will do all in
his power to ﬁnd out what it is before he acts : ‘ if he neglects the situation, the
situation will not neglect him’.136 This, for Cowling, generated a sociology of
power : individuals persuading, or trying to persuade other individuals to do
things in conditions of complexity, subject to ﬂuctuation, and often with un-
knowable eﬀects.
There is no reason to assume that the methodology proposed by Cowling made
the writing of history impossible. Indeed, though he seems to avoid the sorts of
social, institutional, and structural analysis Ghosh believes essential, this is not a
necessary consequence of his approach. Again, Bevir’s work is suggestive. In an
account of modern British governance he – along with Rod Rhodes – has re-
sponded to two major criticisms of interpretative theories. The ﬁrst is that they
cannot account for the ‘solidity and persistence ’ of institutions. Bevir and Rhodes
respond that too often institutions are deﬁned as ‘ﬁxed operating procedures or
rules that constrain, arguably even determine’ actions, and that instead one
should analyse the ways institutions are ‘produced, reproduced and changed
through the particular and contingent beliefs, preferences and actions of in-
dividuals. Even when an institution maintains similar routines while personnel
134 Cowling, Nature and limits, pp. 18–19, 124. 135 Cowling, Mill and liberalism, p. 107.
136 Collingwood, Idea of history, p. 316. Cowling also favoured the language of ‘ situation’. See Nature
and limits, pp. 178–85 and 1867, pp. 312–15.
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changes, it does so mainly because the successive personnel pass on similar beliefs
and preferences. ’137 While Cowling generally bracketed questions of long-term
institutional change, the methodology is not inconsistent with such enquiries. A
second objection is that interpretative approaches cannot allow for material
constraints on social actions. Bevir and Rhodes respond that, while they oppose
economic determinism, they can accommodate economic inﬂuences. While it
was always the ‘ subjective beliefs people hold about the world ’ that mattered, it
was always possible that such beliefs arose ‘because of pressures in the world ’,
and that therefore ‘dilemmas often reﬂect material circumstances ’.138 Cowling
was generally careful to indicate the way that perceptions of economic conditions
aﬀected how politicians acted. He would also have endorsed Bevir’s and Rhodes’s
comment that governments cannot determine the consequences of their actions :
‘The eﬀects will depend on how others react and their reactions will collectively
constitute a relevant material reality. ’139 Just as politicians have perceptions of
the populace, so too the people have perceptions of politicians which aﬀect
how they think and behave. The central point, however, is not whether one
endorses Bevir’s arguments, but that Cowling adopted positions which ﬁnd
remarkable resonance in some of the most recent and reﬂective accounts of
historical method.
There is a further point. Cowling’s writings in the 1960s and 1970s supply both
a coherent methodology and a substantive history. These are often assumed to be
interdependent, but in fact they are not. Cowling chose to focus on ‘high politics ’
not because of his methodological commitments but because of his sociological
interests. In The nature and limits of political science, he argued that contemporary
political sociology – especially ideas about the inﬂuence of e´lites – did not have
the requisite source materials to generate genuine insights. Instead, ‘much may
be said for the view that political sociology will ﬂourish best by turning attention
to the innumerable questions which are still unanswered about the power, habits
and intentions of the British political elite of the day before yesterday’.140 The
‘high politics ’ trilogy was Cowling’s answer to this problem in sociology, a
problem which necessarily required examining the history of the political e´lite. If
he had been interested in some other aspect of history, he could have adopted the
same methodological positions (though he may have felt the source material in-
suﬃcient). This was made abundantly clear in The nature and limits of political science
which stated that its procedures applied to ‘all political action’ and operated in
‘all societies ’.141 This could be as true of popular politics as of parliamentary
politics, and indeed of the operation of power in a more diﬀused setting.
What then of ‘high politics ’ and the ‘new political history ’? The historians of
‘high politics ’ have become increasingly interested in intellectual history since the
1970s – without abandoning concern for tactical questions – and it is probable
137 M. Bevir and R. Rhodes, Interpreting British governance (London, 2003), pp. 63, 41.
138 Ibid., p. 41. 139 Ibid.
140 Cowling, Nature and limits, p. 174. 141 Ibid., pp. 178, 189.
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that ‘cultural ’ approaches to politics may yield further insights. Conversely ‘new
political history ’ may be able to learn more from the idea – understood by
Cowling and Skinner – that rhetoric could be used by all manner of persons to
disguise motives and achieve ends. If there is a gap now between the two ‘schools ’,
it is less about method and more about subject. The ‘new political historians ’ are
still largely preoccupied by the concerns of electoral sociology, popular politics,
and labour history, and – occasionally – can express disdain for ‘high politics ’.
The compliment has often been returned in kind. There are, however, signs that
this gap too is being narrowed. If, in the 1960s and 1970s, it was claimed that ‘high
politics ’ was a ‘closed’ world, by the 1980s and 1990s this had become ‘half-
closed’ or ‘ largely autonomous ’.142 A half-closed world is also a half-open one,
and Lawrence Goldman has rightly urged attention to the points of interaction
and contact between ‘high’ and ‘ low’ politics.143 Jon Lawrence has recently
pressed this thought further, arguing that there is little justiﬁcation for these ‘ring-
fenced’ endeavours and that a focus on the interconnectedness of the whole of
politics is surely desirable.144 This is salutary, although, as Jonathan Parry notes,
there was never a complete ﬁt between parliamentary and popular politics : ‘each
world had its own cultures, traditions and priorities, and eﬀective connections can
be made between them only once historians are clear what these were ’.145
Hopefully, it may soon be recognized both that ‘new political history’ is not
altogether new, and that ‘high politics ’ need not always be high.
142 M. Bentley and J. Stevenson, ‘Introduction’ in idem, High and low politics, p. 1 ; P. Williamson,
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143 L. Goldman, Science, reform, and politics in Victorian Britain : the Social Science Association 1857–1886
(Cambridge, 2002), pp. 7–11.
144 J. Lawrence, ‘Political history’, in S. Berger, H. Feldner, and K. Passmore, eds., Writing history :
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